10 more overs

It's been 21 months since Australia strode to a famous World Cup victory at Lord's. Counted out by many, Australia had to remain undefeated across its final seven matches of the tournament in order to claim the crown.

It managed to do so thanks to self-belief, a little luck, and a formidable, disciplined bowling attack. The attack that routed Pakistan for 132 in the final consisted of Glenn McGrath, Damien Fleming, Paul Reiffel, Shane Warne and Tom Moody -- in essence, four specialist bowlers and an all-rounder. Paul Reiffel and Tom Moody have since retired.

The next World Cup in South Africa is two years away. And let's face it, the majority of matches between the quadrennial pinnacle of one-day achievement are glorified practice hit-outs. In an attempt to give them more relevance, the ICC approved a South African initiative to make results count towards tournament seeding in 2003. During this extended period of preparation, something has changed about the Australian one-day team. More than the composition of the team itself, there has been a gradual and largely unnoticed shift in team tactics: Not the recently controversial yet sensible rotation policy, but the less-publicised and more important change in the structure of the bowling attack.

The design of the attack that bowled Australia to victory in the semifinals and final of that World Cup has changed. Between then and now, the selectors appear to have decreed that Australia play an extra batsman and select only three specialist bowlers. It's not enough, and it's costing the Aussies. Stacking the batting order to fearlessly maintain a high run rate is not worth it when it comes at the expense of a complete bowling attack.

On the surface, it appears that Australia's recent one-day losses have resulted from the failures of its batsmen. While partly true, the reason for it lies in the bowling department. Selecting just three genuine bowlers has enabled India to set high targets and as a consequence, the batting has faltered under the pressure of chasing them. Australia has depth in batting, apparently too much for its own good, but it's not enough to consistently chase scores above 250. It needs a fourth bowler.

Against weaker teams, this deficiency has been successfully masked. In the steamrolling of West Indies and Zimbabwe -- hardly world powers of one-day cricket -- in the overlong home tri-series, Australia got away with playing a bowler short due to weaknesses in the opposition and the strength of its own batsmen against those lesser attacks. Despite playing a West Indies team on a low after a miserable Test series, the West Indies scored 299 in the second final. In two previous matches against Zimbabwe, the African minnows totalled 301 and 279. Not counting all-rounder Ian Harvey, Australia played three genuine bowlers in two of those three matches, with Symonds, Martyn and Bevan called upon to collectively provide the fifth bowling option. In 10 Carlton series matches, Australia selected four bowlers just three times.

Australia craves a bowling all-rounder in the mould of South Africa's Shaun Pollock or Lance Klusener. But since it does not possess one, it cannot go on pretending it does. With the retirement of Tom Moody, Ian Harvey has seemingly inherited the important all-rounder's role. Harvey is a serviceable bowler -- almost pioneering a new style, that of "right-arm slower-ball bowler" -- and handy batsman. He would make an ideal 5th bowler, able to contribute 10 overs on most occasions and restrict batsmen at the death. But currently, Harvey is being picked as a specialist, leaving the "fifth bowler" duties to Andrew Symonds and Damien Martyn. Now, no offence to these talented batsmen, but they are just that -- batsmen. Australia is attempting to make them into all-rounders, a worthy venture which could eventually pay dividends. At present, though, they are not up to international standards with the ball and will be exploited by better teams, like India in the current series.

There is a cricket axiom that if six batsmen aren't enough, one more won't make any difference. While not quite true, when that batsman is occupying a spot better utilised by a fourth bowler, it is almost always the case. The trade-off of one less bowler in exchange for increased batting depth never quite works out.

So, why is Australia trying to deepen batting that would remain strong if not consistently faced with large targets? Bowling is Australia's strength in the Test arena and, backed up by a fielding unit second only to South Africa, has been so in one-day cricket, too. Now, however, it's no longer in control of an innings as part-timers have to be squeezed in and momentum consequently handed to the opposition. The release of pressure from their stints at the bowling crease also adversely affects the main strikers, who are suddenly under more pressure to keep it tight.

In Indore, Australia's "fifth bowler" consisted of four overs each from Symonds and Martyn and two from Michael Bevan. Tendulkar and Laxman made them pay, as the combined 10 overs from that trio cost 91. By contrast, Ian Harvey's 10 overs went for 48. That's a big difference. Assuming a fourth specialist bowler would return respectable figures, a 43-run difference is worth sacrificing an extra batsman for.

Part of the reason for selecting a downsized attack is undoubtedly due to the rotation of players, attempting to discover what the lesser members of the squad have to offer. A fit Jason Gillespie and Brett Lee might affect this strategy. But even with more bowlers available, Australia has still demonstrated a recent preference for an extra batsman. The sooner it discards a seventh batsman in favour of in favour of a fourth bowler, the sooner it will return to its best one-day form. An ideal Australian attack would read McGrath, Fleming, Lee/Gillespie (having both these high-intensity pacemen fit concurrently may not occur too often) and Warne, with Harvey acting as the bowling all-rounder and either Martyn or Symonds saved for emergency use in the right conditions.

In the experimentation and exploration of talent, Australia has lost sight of the strengths that made it a highly successful one-day outfit. To win another World Cup title two years hence, Australia will need a full complement of bowlers and the faith in them to defend any target the batsmen set. Or to restrict the opposition to totals their batsmen can chase.

Mail Daniel Laidlaw